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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of the Case. 
This is an Appeal by Mark Nolan Paradis of the District Court's decision that an Idaho 
Transportation Department Hearing Examiner had correctly determined that Mr. Paradis had not 
met his burden to demonstrate a basis existed under LC. § 18-8002A(7) to set aside the Idaho 
Transportation Department's Administrative License Suspension. The District Court affirmed the 
Hearing Examiner's decision to suspend Mr. Paradis's driving privileges as a result of a failed 
evidentiary test for breath alcohol content. 
b. Party References. 
The Idaho Transportation Department is referred to as the "Department" for purposes of 
this argument. Mr. Paradis is specifically referred to by name. Where "driver" is used, it is in 
reference to drivers generally. 
c. Reference to the Administrative Record. 
The Idaho County District Court Clerk has submitted the Record to the Supreme Court. 
The Clerk's Record consists of pleadings filed with the District Court and the Agency Record 
which is made an exhibit to the Clerk's Record. The Transcript of the Administrative License 
Suspension proceeding before the Department is separately identified in the Clerk's Record. 
References to the Department's Record will be by the page numbers noted on the Exhibit to the 
Clerk's Record as "R. Ex. 1 p. _." The Transcript from the Department's ALS Hearing will be 
referenced "Tr. ALS p. _." Any reference to the hearing before the District Court will be 
referred to as "Tr." 
d. Factual Statement and Procedural History. 
On June 26, 2016 at approximately midnight Idaho County Sheriffs Deputy Craig 
Hoodman stopped a 2007 Dodge Truck on Halford Road just off Stites Road in rural Idaho County, 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF I 
outside Grangeville, Idaho for failing to maintain its lane of travel. Prior to the stop Deputy 
Hoodman had observed the vehicle's passenger side tires partially leave the travel way several 
times with the tires touching the grass on the edge of the road causing dust to fly up off the side of 
the road and then observing the vehicle swerve back onto the travel way, (R. Ex. 1 p. 008). 
Deputy Hoodman made contact with the driver later identified as Mark Nolan Paradis. 
Deputy Hoodman observed a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from the vehicle and 
observed Mr. Paradis to have red and glassy eyes, id. 
Mr. Paradis admitted to consuming alcohol and Deputy Hoodman requested Mr. Paradis 
to perform standardized field sobriety tests), id. 
Mr. Paradis performed the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus, Walk and Tum and One Leg Stand 
tests and failed each of the field sobriety tests, id. 
Deputy Hoodman read the Administrative License Suspension advisory form to Mr. 
Paradis and Mr. Paradis stated that he would submit to a blood draw, id. 
Mr. Paradis' evidentiary test for blood alcohol produced a result of .111 indicating a failed 
evidentiary test, id. 
Mr. Paradis timely requested a hearing with the Idaho Department of Transportation's 
Administrative Hearing Examiner (R. Ex. 1 pp. 017-020). 
A hearing was held telephonically on August 10, 2016. The Department's Hearing 
Examiner entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order sustaining the suspension of 
Mr. Paradis' driving privileges (R. Ex. 1 pp. 202-210). 
Mr. Paradis timely filed a Petition for Judicial Review and the suspension of his driving 
privileges has been stayed by the Court during the pendency of this matter (R. Ex. 1 pp. 199-201 ). 
The District Court sustained the Department's Hearing Examiner's Decision and this 
Appeal was taken. 
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II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. The Hearing Examiner's determination that legal cause exists for the stop of Mr. 
Paradis' vehicle pursuant to LC. § 18-8002A(7)(a) is supported by substantial evidence 
in the record as a whole. 
2. The Department's Hearing Examiner's conduct of the Administrative License 
Suspension hearing does not demonstrate bias or a violation of due process. 
Mr. Paradis has waived any argument ·that he has met his burden pursuant to LC. § 18-
8002A(7)(b-e). Kugler v. Drowns, 119 Idaho 687, 809 P.2d 1116 (1991), Wheeler v. IDHW, 147 
Idaho 257, 207 P.3d 988, 996 (2009). 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Idaho Code § 18-8002A(7) sets out the burden of the driver to demonstrate to the 
Hearing Examiner that driving privileges should be reinstated because: 
(a) The peace officer did not have legal cause to stop the person; or 
(b) The officer did not have legal cause to believe the person had been 
driving or was in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation 
of the provisions of section 18-8004, 18-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code; 
or; 
( c) The test results did not show an alcohol concentration or the presence 
of drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of section 18-8004, 
18-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code; or 
( d) The tests for alcohol concentration, drugs or other intoxicating 
substances administered at the direction of the peace officer were not 
conducted in accordance with the requirements of section 18-8004( 4 ), 
Idaho Code, or the testing equipment was not functioning properly when 
the test was administered; or 
(e) The person was not informed of the consequences of submitting to 
evidentiary testing as required in subsection (2) of this section. 
The review of disputed issues of fact must be confined to the agency record for 
judicial review, Idaho Code § 67-5277. 
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Idaho Code § 67-5279(1) sets out the scope of review. "The Court shall not 
substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions 
of fact." Howard v. Canyon County Board of Commissioners, 128 Idaho 479, 915 P.2d 
709 (1996). 
Idaho Code § 67-5279(3) provides: 
When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or by other 
provision oflaw to issue an order, the court shall affirm the agency action unless 
the court finds that the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions 
are: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 
( c) made upon unlawful procedure; 
( d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or 
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
The appropriate remedy pursuant to the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act is: " . 
. . if the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part and remanded 
for further proceedings as necessary." Idaho Code § 67-5279(3). 
The decision of the Department's Hearing Examiner must be affirmed unless the 
order violates statutory or constitutional provisions, exceeds the agency's authority, is 
made upon unlawful procedure, is not supported by substantial evidence or is arbitrary, 
capricious or an abuse of discretion. Marshall v. Idaho Transportation Department, 137 
Idaho 337, 48 P.3d 666 (2002). The party challenging the agency decision must 
demonstrate that the agency erred in a manner specified in Idaho Code § 67-5279(3) and 
that a substantial right of that party has been prejudiced. Druffel v. State, Dept. of Trans., 
136 Idaho 853, 41 P.3d 739 (2002). 
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Further, the grounds for vacating a license suspension on judicial review are limited 
to those set out in LC. § 18-8002A(7), State Transp. Dept. v. Kalani-Keegan, 155 Idaho 
297, 311 P.3d 309 (Ct. App. 2013). 
Appellate review of the District Court's decision requires the Court to review "the 
agency record independently of the District Court's decision", Marshall v. Dept. ofTransp. 
137 Idaho 337,340, 48 P.3d666,669 (Ct. App. 2002). 
Mr. Paradis has not set forth a sufficient legal basis to set aside the administrative 
action of the Department suspending Mr. Paradis' driving privileges. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
ISSUE I. 
The Hearing Examiner's determination that legal cause exists for the stop of Mr. Paradis' 
vehicle pursuant to J.C.§ 18-8002A(7)(a) is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a 
whole. 
Mr. Paradis contends that legal cause did not exist for the stop of Mr. Paradis' vehicle. The 
proper inquiry on Judicial Review is whether the Department's Hearing Examiner's decision that 
legal cause exists for the stop of Mr. Paradis' vehicle is supported by substantial evidence on the 
record as a whole, LC. § 67-5279(3). 
The duration or circumstances of the detection of Mr. Paradis does not eliminate the 
reasonable and articulable suspension for the stop of Mr. Paradis's vehicle, In re Suspension of 
Driver's License ofGibbar, 143 Idaho 937, 155 P.3d 1176 (Ct. App. 2006). 
The circumstances of Mr. Paradis' arrest does not affect the analysis of whether Mr. Paradis 
has demonstrated that there is not legal cause for the stop of Mr. Paradis' vehicle or that there is 
not legal cause for Deputy Hoodman's belief that Mr. Paradis was operating a motor vehicle under 
the influence of alcohol contrary to LC. § 18-8004. 
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Mr. Paradis simply asks the Court to substitute its judgment for that of the Department's 
Hearing Examiner contrary to the Court's role in Judicial Review, LC.§ 67-5279(1). 
The Hearing Examiner makes factual findings consistent with the Record before him. 1 
I. 
Did Deputy Hoodman have legal cause to stop the vehicle Paradis was driving? 
I. Idaho Code §49-630(1) provides "Upon all highways of sufficient width a vehicle shall be driven 
upon the right half of the roadway". 
2. Deputy Hoodman stopped the vehicle driven by Paradis for failing to maintain its lane of travel. 
3. The vehicle's passenger side tires partially left the paved road several times as the vehicle traveled 
south on Stites Road from the top of Lambs Grade. 
4. The vehicle's passenger side tires would touch the grass on the edge of the road causing dust to fly up 
off the side of the road and then the vehicle would swerve back onto the road. 
5. After Paradis activated the right tum signal, Deputy Hoodman stopped the vehicle. 
6. Paradis and his wife testified the vehicle's tires did not leave the road. 
7. The testimonies of Paradis and his wife were based upon their view of the vehicle's tires while Pardis 
was driving the vehicle and his wife was sitting in the front passenger seat. 
8. Because Deputy Hoodman was following the vehicle, a reasonable inference can be made that 
Deputy Hoodman was clearly in a better position to personally observe the vehicle's tires going off 
the road. 
9. Based upon their testimonies, it appears Paradis and his wife were distracted by the patrol vehicle's 
headlights shining inside their vehicle and not focused on how Paradis was driving. 
l 0. The testimonies of Paradis and his wife were unsupportive, cumulative and did not outweigh Deputy 
Hoodman's testimony and Exhibit 5. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order, R. pp. 189-190. 
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In the Administrative License Suspension setting, the Court of Appeals has described the 
legal cause analysis appropriate to determine whether Mr. Paradis has met his burden pursuant to 
I.C. § 18-8002A(7)(a).2 
The Idaho Court treats the question of legal cause for a stop based on a driver's failure to 
maintain the lane of travel as a specific fact question sometimes leading to inconsistent results. 3 
Mr. Paradis' reliance on the Idaho Supreme Court decision in State v Neal, 159 Idaho 439, 
360 2P. 3rd 514 (2015) is misplaced. The Court's inquiry in Neal is specifically limited to a motor 
vehicle "driving on the fog line". The Court's conclusion in Neal is clearly limited to "driving onto 
but not across the line marking the right edge of the roadway" Neal at 522. 
Gibbar argues the evidence did not support a finding that the officer had legal cause to stop him. A traffic 
stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants and implicates the Fourth Amendment's 
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S. Ct. I 391, 
1395-96, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 667 (1979); State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 
(Ct.App.1996). Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal 
behavior if there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic 
laws. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, JOI S.Ct. 690, 694-95, 66 L.Ed.2d 621, 628-29 (1981); 
State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 208, 953 P.2d 645, 648 (Ct.App.1998). The reasonableness of the suspicion 
must be evaluated upon the totality of the circumstances at the time of the stop. State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 
474, 483, 988 P.2d 700, 709 (Ct.App.1999). The reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable 
cause but more than mere speculation or instinct on the part of the officer. id. An officer may draw reasonable 
inferences from the facts in his or her possession, and those inferences may be drawn from the officer's 
experience and law enforcement training. State v. Montague, 114 Idaho 319, 321, 756 P.2d 1083, 1085 
(Ct.App.1988). Suspicion will not be found to be justified if the conduct observed by the officer fell within 
the broad range of what can be described as normal driving behavior. Atkinson, 128 Jdaho at 561, 916 P.2d 
at 1286. 143 Idaho 943. 
In re Suspension of Driver's License of Gibbar, 143 Idaho 937, 155 P.3d 1176 (Ct. App. 2006). 
3 See: 
State v. Morris, 159 Jdaho 651, 365 P.3d 407 (Ct. App. 2015). 
State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, No. 42730, 2016 Jda. App. (Ct. App. June 9, 2016) 
Trottier v. State, 155 Idaho 17, 304 P.3d 292 (Ct. App. 2013) 
State v Neal, 159 Jdaho 439, 362 P. 3d 514 (2015). 
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Deputy Hoodman's unrefuted testimony is that roadway where he observed Mr. Paradis 
driving was a country road without a line marking the edge of the roadway.4 
Neal is not applicable here because Deputy Hoodman suspicion for the stop is based on his 
observation of a motor vehicle traveling on a country road driving on to or over the grassy edge of 
the roadway. 5 
Deputy Hoodman indicates that the roadway was paved (R. Ex. p. 008). Mr. Paradis 
testifies the roadway was gravel. 6 
4 Examination of Deputy Hoodman: 
7 Q. Okay. And describe the roadway that you were 
8 on at the time. 
9 A. It's a county road. It has no center stripes 
IO or fog lines or anything like that. 
11 Q. There's no real shoulder? There's just grass 
12 and the ditch; is that right? 
13 A. In some places, yes. In some places, there's 
14 agriculture that comes up to it. It just varies. It 
15 changes as you come - as you drive down it. 
Tr. ALS p. 52, LL. 7-15. 
5 Roadway means that portion ofa highway improved, designed or ordinarily used for vehicular travel 
exclusive of sidewalks, shoulders, berms and right of way, J.C. § 49-119. 
6 Examination of Mark Paradis: 
13 Q. Okay. And describe for the Hearing Officer the 
14 roadway at that time. 
15 A. There was gravel. Dirt and gravel. 
16 Q. Okay. Does it have lines? A center line? Fog 
17 line? 
18 A. 
19 Q. 
20 A. 
21. foot high. 
No. The grass at that time was nearly three 
Is it - is there a shoulder? 
No. The grass at that time was nearly three 
Tr. ALS p. 65, LL. 13-21. 
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In spite of Mr. Paradis' testimony before the Department's Hearing Examiner, he now 
contends that the road was paved. Mr. Paradis' references to the lack of marked lines further 
indicates his reliance on Neal is not appropriate. 7 
The Hearing Examiner concluded that Mr. Paradis' vehicle had left the paved roadway on 
several occasions causing dust to fly up off the side of the road, see FN 1 Findings of Fact, 1.3 1.4 
R. Ex. 1 p. 189. Dust would fly up only if Mr. Paradis had left the paved roadway consistent with 
the facts now relied on by Paradis. 
Here the Hearing Examiner determined that there was substantial evidence in the record as 
a whole to support the conclusion that Deputy Hoodman had legal cause to effect a motor vehicle 
stop (See FN 1 Findings 1.1-1.10). 
These facts in Mr. Paradis' case are undisputed; (1) Mr. Paradis was followed for 11 miles or approximately 
20 minutes on a stretch of highway, (2) where there was no traffic and it was paved road with no marked 
lanes or lines, (3) the vegetation was growing up over the side of the road, (4) the Deputy would drive up 
onto Mr. Paradis and then back off and then drive up onto Mr. Paradis and then back off and then drive up 
on Mr. Paradis and then back off, (5) the Deputy thought Mr. Paradis' vehicle was actually some other vehicle 
that law enforcement had been looking for, and (6) Mr. Paradis decided to avoid this Deputy's bad driving 
and decided to tum off. (emphasis added). 
Appellant's Briefp. 15. 
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Mr. Paradis simply asks the Court to substitute its judgment for that of the Hearing 
Examiner. Deputy Hoodman testifies that he stopped Mr. Paradis for failing to maintain his lane 
of travel, specifically observing Paradis to "drift off to the right side of the road." 8 
Ms. Paradis' testimony is consistent with Deputy Hoodman's description of Mr. Paradis' 
driving.9 
8 Examination of Deputy Hoodman: 
17 Q. Okay. And what was the traffic stop actually made for? 
18 made for? 
19 A. Failure to maintain his lane. The driver would 
20 drift off to the right side of the road. His tires 
21 would go into the grass and kick up dirt because he was 
22 actually leaving the roadway partially. 
23 Q. Well, the grass, at that time, was actually 
24 pretty high along the side of the road; isn't that true? 
25 A. What do you consider high? 
I Q. Well, it wasn't mowed down; right? 
2 A. No. 
3 Q. So it wouldn't have been a couple of inches 
4 high. It would have had to have been at least a foot 
5 high at the time of this incident; right? 
6 A. I don't believe it was a foot high, no. 
Tr. ALS p. 54 LL. 17-25 & p. 55 LL. 1-6. 
9 Examination of Shannon Paradis: 
23 Q. And did your husband take any driving action to 
24 avoid what the deputy was doing? 
25 A. Yes. He had decided that he would pull off to 
I let him pass on the next tum. 
2 Q. Okay. And did he do that? 
3 A. Yes, he did. 
Tr. ALS p. 64 LL. 23-25 & p. 65 LL 1-3. 
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Mr. Paradis testifies that his driving off the roadway was also consistent with Deputy 
Hoodman's observations. 10 
Mr. Paradis testifies that he moved to the right to permit the vehicle behind him to pass. 
Mr. Paradis does not testify that he knew it was a County Sheriffs vehicle. However, Mr. Paradis 
does not remain pulled over to let the vehicle behind pass him. Mr. Paradis description of his 
efforts to move to the right were consistent with Deputy Hoodman's observation of Mr. Paradis' 
vehicle drifting off to the right side of the road. 11 
Mr. Paradis simply asks the Court now to second guess the Hearing Examiner's factual 
findings based on an explanation of Mr. Paradis' driving which he argues would not provide 
Deputy Hoodman sufficient legal cause. 
A driver's explanation of his behavior after the fact has been rejected by the Court as a 
basis for the driver to meet his burden. 12 
10 Examination of Mark Paradis: 
9 Q. Would it have been possible for your vehicle to 
IO have made contact with the vegetation along the side of 
11 the road? 
12 A. Yes. The grass was way over off the edge of 
13 the road and into the roadway, and I've always - when 
14 somebody is following me, you give them as much room as 
15 you can and let them by to get them out from behind you. 
16 Q. Okay. 
17 A. And that's what I was trying to do. If I 
18 (indiscernible) up, it would be way over the roadway. 
19 If I would have ever left the roadway one time, I would 
20 have been in the ditch. 
Tr. ALS p. 72 LL. 9-20. 
II 
The Hearing Examiner also has the benefit of the affidavit submitted by Deputy Hoodman (R. Ex. I pp. 007-009). 
12 
Gibbar's " .... alternative explanation for his appearance and driving do not overcome the evidence possessed by the 
officer. .. . Gibbar at 944. 
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The Appellate Court's review oflegal cause simply asks whether there is a sufficient record 
to support the Hearing Examiner's conclusion that there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion 
that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws, Gibbar at 943. Mr. Paradis' driving did 
not fall within the broad range of what can be described as normal driving behavior. 
By offering an alternative explanation for his behavior, Mr. Paradis acknowledges the 
factual accuracy of Deputy Hoodman's observations and simply asks the Court now to substitute 
its judgment for that of the Hearing Examiner to explain why Mr. Paradis' driving was really 
within the broad range of what can be described as normal driving behavior, Gib bar, Id. 
Arguing that Paradis' testimony contradicts the affidavit or the testimony of Deputy 
Hoodman originally asks the Hearing Examiner to make a factual determination. The Hearing 
Examiner made a factual determination of the evidence before him and explains the basis for his 
weighing the evidence on the only issue raised for the Court on Judicial Review LC. § 18-
8002A(7)(a). 
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Paradis fails to set out the standard pursuant to I.C. § 67-5279 applicable to his argument. 
In the Administrative License Suspension setting, the reviewing court reviews the record to 
determine whether the Hearing Examiner's decision is supported by substantial and competent 
evidence in the record as a whole. 13 
Though the Court could disagree with the Hearing Examiner's factual determination, the 
Hearing Examiner sets outs a reasonable basis for his weighing of evidence on the only issue 
before the Court pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002A(7)(a), see Findings of Fact, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, FN 1, R. 
Ex. 1 p. 190. 
Mr. Paradis has failed to meet his burden to demonstrate that the Hearing Examiner's 
determination that legal cause existed for Deputy Hoodman' s stop of Mr. Paradis' vehicle was not 
supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 
The Hearing Examiner's determination that Deputy Hoodman had legal cause to stop Mr. 
Paradis' vehicle is supported by substantial evidence in the Record and should be affirmed. 
13 
The reviewing court, including the district court on intermediate appeal, does not substitute its judgment 
for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence presented. The court instead defers to the agency's 
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. The agency's factual determinations are binding on the 
reviewing court, even where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the 
determinations are supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record. Marshall, 137 Idaho 
at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. We decline the invitation to simply substitute our view of the evidence for that 
of the hearing officer. However, we still review the evidence in the record to determine whether the 
hearing officer's factual findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Clearly erroneous 
factual findings are not entitled to our deference. Trottier v. State, I 55 Idaho 17, 304 P.3d 292, 298 (Ct. 
App. 2013). 
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ISSUE 2. 
The Hearing Examiner's conduct of the Administrative License Suspension hearing does 
not demonstrate bias or a violation of due process. 
Mr. Paradis argues that Hearing Examiner Moody was biased based on Hearing Examiner 
Moody's conduct of the hearing. It is difficult to evaluate the facts relied upon by Paradis for the 
claim that the bias of the Department's Hearing Examiner violated the process Paradis is due. A 
substantial amount of the argument submitted on the issue of whether Mr. Paradis met his burden 
to show Deputy Hoodman did not have legal cause for the stop of Paradis' vehicle is couched in 
terms of the Hearing Examiner's bias. Paradis also make references to exhibits or to testimony 
relevant to other issues in LC. § 18-8002A(7) (b-e ). None of the issues of LC. § 18-8002A(7)(b-
e) were before the District Court and are not before the Court on appeal based on Paradis' 
identification of the issues. Mr. Paradis' argument appear to be worn policy arguments rejected 
consistently by the Idaho Court on appeal. 
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Hearing Examiner Moody declined to let Mr. Paradis inquire about Deputy Hoodman's 
prior employment as not being relevant. Mr. Paradis fails to suggest to the Hearing Examiner how 
the Deputy's prior work history is relevant and fails to assist the Hearing Examiner in determining 
whether Deputy Hoodman's credibility is or should be at issue. 14 
The Idaho Rules of Evidence do not apply in Administrative License Suspension hearings 
conducted under the Rules of Administrative Proceedings of the Attorney General, IDAP A 
04.11.01.600 (Rule 600). The Hearing Examiner is charged with determining what evidence is 
14 
6 Q. What was your reason for leaving that 
7 employment? 
8 THE HEARING OFFICER: That's not relevant, 
9 Mr. Stroschein. 
JO MR. STROSCHEIN: How do you know? 
11 THE HEARING OFFICER: I know because that's not 
12 part of this A.L.S. process. Please continue with other 
13 questions. 
14 
15 
MR. STROSCHEIN: Well, just to make a record -
THE HEARIN OFFICER: The personnel history 
16 of-
17 MR. STROSCHEIN: It goes to credibility. 
18 THE HEARING OFFICER: That's a personnel 
19 matter. You do not need to ask that question. And I 
20 don't care what you feel. You can appeal it. 
21 Go on with the next question. 
22 MR. STROSCHEIN: Well, I'm debating whether or 
23 not I should just make a record about the biased nature 
24 of you, as a Hearing Officer. 
25 THE HEARING OFFICER: That is not a bias, 
l Mr. Stroschein. That is a personnel matter between the 
2 Deputy and his previous employer. 
3 MR. STROSCHEIN: So ifhe was relieved of duty 
4 Because of being untruthful, that wouldn't be relevant 
5 To this - or that he doctored DUI stops? 
6 He probably would have just told me that he 
7 Changed his position because of wanting to relocate or 
8 whatever. So you have made this a much bigger deal than 
9 it probably should have been. So you've made your 
IO record as to your attitude with regard to this. 
11 THE HEARING OFFICER: And you have made your 
12 Attitude, too, sire. So proceed. 
13 MR. STROSCHEIN: I'm not the Hearing Officer. 
14 THE HEARING OFFICER: I told you to proceed. 
Tr. ALS p. 33 LL. 6-25 p. 34 LL. 1-14. 
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appropriate for his consideration and may without obiection exclude ( emphasis mine) evidence that 
he determines is not relevant (Rule 600). The Hearing Examiner may consider evidence if it is 
commonly relied on by prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs, Id. 
Mr. Paradis does not offer any showing as to why Deputy Hoodman's prior work history was 
relevant here. The Hearing Examiner's determination that the prior work history of Deputy 
Hoodman is not relevant is appropriate based on the record developed by Paradis. Paradis does 
not make any attempt to show why it is that the Hearing Examiner should consider Deputy 
Hoodman's work experience as it relates to Deputy Hoodman's testimony in this proceeding. 15 
The Department's Hearing Examiner considered only the issues required by Mr. Paradis' 
request for a hearing pursuant to LC. § 18-8002A(7) and did not exceed his authority by deciding 
only those issues. Based on this Record the Hearing Examiner did not abuse his discretion when 
he limited Mr. Paradis' examination of Deputy Hoodman, LC. § 67-5279(3)(b). 
The Hearing Examiner is also entitled to consider the sworn statement of Deputy Hoodman 
(R. Ex. 1 p. 007-008) without the necessity of the testimony of Deputy Hoodman. 16 
The decision to call Deputy Hoodman is entirely the strategy choice of Paradis. If done 
for the purpose of showing that Deputy Hoodman is not credible, Paradis has to do more. 
15 
Paradis peppers the argument regarding the Hearing Examiner's conclusion that Paradis had not meet his burden to 
show that Deputy Hoodman did not have legal cause for the stop of Paradis' vehicle with references to why the Court 
should conclude that Deputy Hoodman was not credible (an evidentiary issue), but does not tie those arguments into 
Paradis' claims that the Hearing Examiner's decision to limit the inquiry violates Paradis due process. 
16 
Upon receipt of the sworn statement of a peace officer that there existed legal cause to believe a person had been 
driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs or other 
intoxicating substances and that the person submitted to a test of the test results indicated an alcohol concentration or 
the presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of section 18-8004, 18-8004 C or 18-8006, Idaho 
code, the Department shall suspend the person's driver's license, drivers permit, driving privileges or nonresident 
driving privileges ... I.C. § l 8-8002A( 4)(a) ( emphasis added) 
The sworn statement of the arresting officer and a copy of the notice of suspension issued by the officer shall be 
admissible at the hearing without further evidentiary foundation, I.C l 8-8002A(7). (emphasis added) 
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However, the question of credibility goes to the weight that the Hearing Examiner should 
place on the testimony not whether the Hearing Examiner is biased in limiting the inquiry of 
Paradis. Paradis conflates the evidentiary question which requires deference to the Hearing 
Examiner with the thus far unsubstantiated argument of the bias of the Hearing Examiner. 
The Court's review of the Hearing Examiner's conduct of the hearing was limited by 
Paradis in the characterization of the issues before the District Court to the simple question of 
whether Deputy Hoodman had legal cause to stop Paradis, LC. § 18-8002A(7)(a). Deputy 
Hoodman has set out in his sworn statement the reasonable articulable suspicion for his stop of 
Paradis' vehicle, R. Ex. 1 pp. 007-008. Instead of using Deputy Hoodman's sworn statement, for 
example as the basis to challenge Deputy Hoodman's credibility, Paradis without showing any 
factual basis for his question, seeks to inquire as to Deputy Hoodman's prior employment. 
Paradis then instead of demonstrating why the evidence of Deputy Hoodman's prior 
employment was relevant simply challenges the impartiality of the Hearing Examiner. 
Paradis then fails to make a record as to the bias of the Hearing Examiner. The Hearing 
Examiner is not biased when making an evidentiary ruling that he is entitled by rule to make, just 
because Paradis does not like the Hearing Examiner's ruling. The Hearing Examiner based on this 
record does not demonstrate any bias directed toward Paradis or Counsel and redirects the 
inquiry. 17 
As the District Court appropriately determined, based on this record, the Hearing 
Examiner's decision was appropriate, LC. § 67-5279(3)(e). 
17 Paradis makes no effort before the Hearing Examiner, before the District Court and now before this Court to 
demonstrate what kind of bias the Hearing Examiner suffered from and how this record demonstrates the Hearing 
Examiner's bias. 
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There is nothing in this record to suggest the Hearing Examiner's procedure was unlawful, 
LC. § 67-5279(3)(c) Such a showing is necessary for Mr. Paradis to meet his burden, Hawkins v. 
!TD, 384 P.3d 420, (Idaho Ct. App. 2016). 
Neither is the Hearing Examiner arbitrary and capricious in ruling that Deputy Hoodman's 
work history based on this record is not relevant. The Hearing Examiner explains why he 
determined that the questioning by Counsel was not relevant, LC. § 67-5279(3)(e). 
Mr. Paradis makes unsubstantiated and generalized arguments that the Hearing Examiner's 
conduct of the Administrative License Suspension hearing violates Paradis constitutional or 
statutory rights. Mr. Paradis does not indicate how his rights of due process were in anyway 
violated by the Hearing Examiner's process, LC. § 67-5279(3 )( a). 18 
Paradis cites to his objection made to the Hearing Examiner as a basis for the lack of 
impartiality of the Hearing Examiner, R. Ex. 1 pp. 170-171. Paradis was apparently concerned 
that some unidentified Department's Hearing Examiners were in some also unidentified hearing 
asking leading or suggestive questions without again any specific reference to this Hearing 
Examiner's prior hearing conduct. 19 
Paradis without supplementing the record for this Court's review asks the Court to consider 
an argument that was not made to the Hearing Examiner or the District Court (see Appellants Brief 
18 To challenge the agency's decision, Hawkins was required to demonstrate that the agency acted improperly pursuant 
to J.C. § 67-5279(3) and that he was prejudiced as a result. See Price, 131 Idaho at 429, 958 P.2d at 586. Claims of 
prejudice must be specific and particularized, as error .will not be presumed, but must be affirmatively shown. See 
Beyer, 155 Idaho at 48, 304 P.3d at 1214. To establish prejudice in the context of a party's challenge to an 
administrative license suspension, a party must allege more than the mere possibility that evidence might have revealed 
something incriminating or discrediting or would have been helpful for preparation. Hawkins v. Idaho Transp. Dep 't, 
384 P.3d 420 at 424 Idaho (Ct. App. 2016). 
19 Paradis also expresses concern that the Hearing Examiner did not sufficiently 'assist' in the examination of a witness 
called by Paradis. (See Appellant's Briefp. 33). It is not clear what role Paradis expects of the Department's Hearing 
Examiner. 
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pp. 34-35, Exhibit A). Further Paradis fails to demonstrate the relationship between the record 
Counsel created in other ALS cases and the failure to develop such a record in this case. It should 
not be necessary to reference the record in other cases, if a record was properly made in this case. 
The failure to create a sufficient record for the Court's judicial review is clearly the failure of 
Paradis,Archer v. Dep't o.fTransp., 145 Idaho 617, 181 P.3d 543 (Ct. App. 2008). 
Mr. Paradis fails to show how he was in any fashion prejudiced by the Hearing Examiner's 
evidentiary ruling or by the process provided, it is clearly Paradis' burden to do so. Hawkins v. 
Idaho Transp. Dep 't, 384 P.3d 420 at 424 Idaho (Ct. App. 2016). 
V. CONCLUSION 
Mr. Paradis has not demonstrated that he met his burden before the Hearing Examiner nor 
that a basis in law exists to set aside the Department's Administrative License Suspension pursuant 
to I.C. § 18-8002A(7). 
The Hearing Examiner's decision does not violate statutory or constitutional provisions 
and is not based on an unlawful procedure. Sufficient evidence exists in the record as a whole to 
support the Hearing Examiner's decision. The Hearing Examiner's decision was not an abuse of 
discretion nor arbitrary and capricious. 
There is no showing that the Hearing Examiner was biased toward Mr. Paradis. 
The suspension of Mr. Paradis' driving privileges should be affirmed and Mr. Paradis' 
driving privileges should be suspended for ninety days. 
DATED the JQ_ day of August, 2017. 
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Edwin L. Litteneker 
Special Deputy Attorney General for 
Idaho Transportation Department 
I DO HEREBY CERTIFY that a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing 
Document was: 
_!__ Mailed by regular first class mail, 
And deposited in the United States 
Post Office 
__ Sent by facsimile and mailed by 
Regular first class mail, and 
Deposited in the United States 
Post Office 
Sent by Federal Express, overnight 
Delivery 
Hand delivered 
To: Charles M. Stroschein 
Clark and Feeney 
P.O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
On the JQ_ day of August, 201 7. 
~~ 
Edwin L. Litteneker 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 20 
